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In the Supreme Court of the Slate of Utah
GLENN C. SHAW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ASHLEY L. ROBISON,
Defendant-Appellant,
KOVO, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Defendant,
vs.
FIRST MEDIA CORPORATION
a Delaware corporation,
Intervenor-Respondent.

No.
13691

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the District Court of Utah County
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action under the receivership laws of
Utah, involving the two equal shareholders of KOVO,
Inc., a Utah corporation, which resulted from a deadlock in the management of the corporation.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After determining that a deadlock existed and appointing a receiver for the corporation, and after repeatedly and consistently encouraging settlement by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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two shareholders of their differences, the Lower Court
ordered that the Receiver sell the corporation's assets
to a third party notwithstanding a prior complete settlement by the shareholders of their differences and their
joint petition to dissolve the receivership.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Both of the shareholders of KOVO, Inc. seek (1)
to have set aside the order that the Receiver sell the
corporation's assets, and (2) a remand of this case with
directions that the Lower Court honor the settlement
made by the owners and dismiss the receivership under
appropriate safeguards for the rights of all interested
parties. In the alternative, appellants seek a determination by this Court that the contract proposed to the Court
for approval fails in important respects to properly protect the interests of appellants and a remand of the case
with directions that the Lower Court insure that the
rights and interests of appellants are properly and adequately protected in any contract provisions which it
may hereafter approve.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Clearly this action involving receivership laws and
accounting between the parties is an equity proceeding.
19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, § 1610, p.970; West v.
West, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965). And, being
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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an equity proceeding, the rule to be followed on this appeal is as stated by this Court in Reiman v. Baum, 115
Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949):
"In equity proceedings in this jurisdiction, this
court reviews both law and facts . . . we review
the record and pass on the weight and sufficiency
of the evidence . . . we determine where lies the
preponderance of the evidence . . . "
To the same effect are Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah
2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970); Provo City v. Jacob sen, 111
Utah 39, 176 P.2d 130 (1947).
The further rule that review on appeal of equity
proceedings
"is in the light most favorable to the findings of
the trial court, who heard the evidence and observed the witnesses" Coombs v. Ouzounicm, 24
Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356, 357 (1970).
would have no application to the present case since the
Lower Court concluded at the conclusion of the evidence,
and all counsel agreed, that '"there is really no material
conflict in the evidence" and "I don't have any fact issues
to decide." (Transcript of Hearing on July 3, 1974,
p.52). Due to the equity nature of this proceeding and
the importance of the specific things done the Statement
of Facts which follows is more detailed than usual.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff Glenn C. Shaw, hereinafter sometimes
referred to as "Shaw," and the defendant Ashley L.
Robison, hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Robison"
are the two equal shareholders of KOVO, Inc., a Utah
corporation, hereinafter referred to as "KOVO," which
for many years has owned and operated radio station
KOVO in Provo, Utah. As a result of serious differences and ill will between Shaw and Robison, the management of the station and its business affairs became
deadlocked. This action was commenced by Shaw for
the appointment of a Receiver and an accounting by
Robison and the corporation. Robison counterclaimed
for an accounting by Shaw and for damages. In addition Shaw and Robison each claimed that substantial
personal obligations were owed by the other and each
claimed that the other was liable for mismanagement
and defamation.
Although the deadlock in the management was apparent soon after the action was filed, (T. May 16, 1973,
p.7 line 22) the Lower Court was extremely reluctant
to appoint a Receiver in view of the fact that the corporation was not insolvent. (T. Aug. 31, 1973, p.7 line
14, p. 11 line 3; T. Sept. 6, 1973, p. 59 line 24, p. 60 line
1 and line 7, p. 61 line 5) At (the urging of the Lower
Court an interim arrangement was worked out in April,
1973 (T. April 24, 1973) soon after the suit was filed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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That arrangement failed and, again at the Lower Court's
urging, a second interim arrangement was worked out
(T. May 16, 1973) in an effort to avoid the necessity for
the court to appoint a Receiver.
Because of a continuing series of differences and
problems further hearings were held in the Lower Court
in late August (T.Aug. 31, 1973) and early September,
1973 (T. Sept. 6, 1973) and a Receiver was finally appointed. (T. Sept. 6, 1973, p.68 line 22) In requesting
that a Receiver be appointed, notwithstanding the Lower
Court's reluctance, it was specifically urged that the
court appoint a Receiver to provide independent management in order to permit (1) the parties to work out a
sale by one to the other, or (2) the sale to a third party.
(T. Aug. 31, 1973, p.22 line 4, p.23 line 12) Even at that
time the scope of the accounting dispute was narrowing
(T. Aug. 31, 1973, p.9 lines 19-21) and there were signs
that with independent management there was a possibility of working out a buy-sell between the owners (T.
Aug. 31, 1973, p.22 line 24)
In appointing the Receiver the Lower Court granted
him full authority "to carry on routine and usual management activities" but directed that
"any unusual or extraordinary expense or management decision must be approved by the Court
after notice to all interested parties and hearing
before the Court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"6. No property, assets or rights of the corporation shall be sold or encumbered in whole or
in part until approved by the Court after notice
to all interested parties and hearing before the
Court;' (R. 107; T. Sept. 6, 1973, p.71 line 20)
The Court then restated the same guideline in more
specific terms:
"I have one other limitation I want to put in expressly. No sale of the business or any of the
assets in whole or in part ivill be binding upon the
corporation until it has . . . prior approval of the
Court. That is the probate rule, gentlemen." (T.
Sept. 6, 1973, p.72 line 17) (Emphasis added)
At the conclusion of the hearing on September 6, 1973,
after the Receiver had been selected and his appointment had been arranged, (T. Sept. 6, 1973, p.70 line 27)
the Lower Court clearly stated, in response to counsel's
specific inquiry, consistent with the continuing serious
effects of the parties toward settlement and the Court's
continuing representations to the parties that if a settlement could be achieved between Shaw and Robison the
receivership would be terminated.
"MR STOTT: One other question if I may,
Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
MR. STOTT: I suppose it's easier to clarify
them now than come back again. In the event the
agreement is arrived at between the parties in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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this matter as to the sale or purchase of the corporation, I suppose at that time the receiver
would be dissolved and we would have no problem
as far as —
THE COURT: Not only would you have no
problems, but the Court would be more than
happy to entertain that petition. I might even
entertain that not on notice. Not quite that far,
but I would be more than happy to see that happen. As a matter of fact, that is what I thought
I was achieving last April.
MR. STOTT: I assumed that was the case"
(T. Sept. 6,1973, p. 76 line 11) (Emphasis added.)
The Court also explicitely left the owners free to sell or
transfer their KOVO stock to each other or to third
parties, (T. Sept. 6, 1973, p.75 line 7) and this freedom
was never restricted in any way thereafter.
This very strong indication from the Court of its
desire that the owners continue their efforts to settle
their own dispute, and the Court's specific assurance
that the owners would have no problem in the event of
a settlement, in having the receivership terminated, left
the owners and their counsel with every reason to believe that their continuing efforts at settlement, if successful, would be honored, at least until a sale of the
assets of the corporation had been finalized and completed. The Court's pointed and explicit encouragement
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to the owners to settle, moreover, continued consistently
thereafter until after such a settlement was finally achieved. Then, surprisingly, the settlement was rejected
by the court.
Following appointment of the Receiver there were
further discussions regarding settlement but the lack
of sufficient financial backing proved to be a serious
handicap. In the meantime the Receiver, and the parties
as well, encouraged interest from third parties to purchase the radio station. Having received various offers
to purchase, counsel for the Receiver in a hearing before
the Court on January 24, 1974 gave a brief status report
and then indicated:
"we hope . . . within a very short time (to) present to the Court . . . those (offers) we consider
to be the highest and best offer, and to seek approval from the Court at that time to proceed
with further negotiations and a final contract
with the parties — the Court finds to be the highest and best offeror." (T. Jan. 24, 1974, p.4 line
11)
At that same hearing the Court characteristically encouraged the parties:
"You gentlemen get together during the next recess I am going to call and quit kidding yourselves and get your pencils out and start arriving
some way to find this fiasco up." (T. Jan. 24,
1974, p.67 line 6)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On January 30, 1974 the Eeceiver petitioned the
Court for a hearing on various purchase offers he had
received and, following the hearing, (R. 151) for an order
"authorizing the Eeceiver to negotiate and execute an appropriate contract of sale of the corporate assets . . . " (E, 151) (Emphasis added.)
At a hearing on the Eeceiver's Motion on February
6, 1974 counsel for the Eeceiver explained that following
the presentation of the offers and selection of the highest
and best one, the Eeceiver would then request
"that the Court authorize the receiver to proceed
to negotiate a firm and binding contract of sale
. . . " (T. Feb. 6, 1974, p.2 line 9) (Emphasis
added.)
Again at that hearing, at which Intervenor's counsel was
present, the Court strongly encouraged settlement, which
at that time was still being actively pursued by the parties.
"I should imagine the only matter the receiver
would be interested in is, and is first and the one
that would make me most happy, for the shareholders to agree on something. The course this
matter has taken since I reluctantly allowed you
to get the Court involved would indicate to me
it would be difficult to get them to agree to the
time of day. (T. Feb. 6, 1974, p,3)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"I think you know, Mr. Roberts, that I don't feel
very comfortable with a matter like this before
me. Would there be any useful purpose served
in Counsel getting together and arriving at what
proposition would be to the best advantage of the
shareholders ?
ME, ROBERTS: Your Honor, I have seriously attempted to do that by way of individual
conversations with Counsel for both the shareholders. My opinion is that —
THE COURT: At least they're talking to
each other, aren't they?
MB. ROBERTS: The attorneysf
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, they are. Yes, they
are. And again I am not challenging the good
faith of anyone.
THE COURT: Neither am I. In a matter
of this nature there are bound to be differences
of opinion. The whole nub of the thing is I would
be most happy if a modus operandi could be worked out or a proposal acceptable to all parties could
be arrived at without the interest of the Court.
MR. ROBERTS: I would be most pleased if
we could do that, Your Honor." (T. Feb. 6, 1974,
p.4)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court further said
"My concern is to try to see to it that whoever
submits the offer that the Court accepts will be
that which is acceptable to Mr. Martineau and his
client and Mr. Stott and his client. You understand that this is not *a liquidating receivership.
MR. HARDY: / understand. (T. Feb. 6,
1974, p.10 line 21) (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Hardy, the attorney representing the Intervenor,
FMC, was as noted, present throughout the hearing on
February 6, 1974.
At the conclusion of that hearing the Court instructed the Receiver to study the offers and make a recommendation to the Court. On February 21, 1974 the Receiver recommended the FMC offer over the equivalent
offer of Robison and the superior offer of Shaw, (R. 170,
171) as a matter of equality of treatment of the two
shareholders. (R. 171). On February 22,1974 the Court
accepted "the report and recommendation of the receiver" and directed that the receiver
"proceed to accept the offer of F.M.C., Inc., and
proceed with all reasonable dispatch to conclude
sale to the offeror." (R. 173)
It was understood by the Receiver and his counsel that
the Court intended by this order not to create a binding
contract but only to give FMC an exclusive opportunity
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to negotiate further with the Receiver. The Receiver, for
example, testified:
U

Q. Wasn't that letter that you received
initially from FMC after the Court's order of
February 22nd used merely as the basis for negotiation of a definite contract?
A. I assumed that these offers were to be
presented to the Court, the Court would then
make its decision as to which offer it would recommend, and then proceedings would be had
from that point on to conclude a contract.
Q. You understand the Court's order would
be merely that one of these offers would be selected so further negotiations could be had?
A. When a contract was finished, then the
Court would approve that contract.
Q. Yes, that would be presented to the Court
before it became finalized?
A. Yes.
Q. That is what is before the Court now in
connection with your motion that Mr. Greene just
mentioned, isn't that true?
A. That is what I understand.
Q. And you have never told FMC that they
had a contract have you?
A. Well, I think that goes ivithout saying.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q. You have never told them that their offer was accepted as such, have you?
A. Well, I don't think I could until it was
approved by either Mr. Roberts or the Judge.
Q. You mean the definitive-final detailed
contract?
A. I left all those matters up to Mr. Roberts
to work out.
Q. Okay. And you expected that before it
became final it would be approved by the Court?
A. Yes
Q. And that it would be executed by you"
A. After approval of the Court?
Q. Yes. But you haven't executed it at this
point, have you?
A. I don't believe I have."
(T. June 28, 1974, p.128, 129) (Emphasis added.)
Similarly the Receiver's counsel testified:
"[W]hat I intended to do as counsel for the receiver was to negotiate, complete the negotiations
of the contract along the lines of the FMC offer,
and I understand procedurally it would be resubmitted to the Court for final approval.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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THE COURT: I suppose you thought you
were carrying out the order of February the 22nd?
MR. ROBERTS: That is what I thought I
was doing . . . procedurally J understand there
would have to be further approval by the Court."
(T. June 28, 1974, p.137 line 5-12, 16-17) (Emphasis added.)
Counsel's letter dated February 27, 1974 advising Mr.
Hardy for FMC that the Receiver's recommendation of
the FMC offer shows a similar understanding of the
Court's order. He there requested
"would you kindly, therefore, submit to me the
draft contract so that we may proceed as soon as
possible to negotiate all final terms and finalize
the matter. (R. 314) (Emphasis added.)
In connection with a general objection to the Receiver's
report and the Court's order of February 22, 1974 approving the Receiver's recommendations counsel for
Robison filed an objection on March 7, 1974 (R. 177) in
which he complained that "the acceptance of any offer
to sell the assets of KOVO, Inc. . . . is premature." (R.
177). At a hearing on that objection on March 15, 1974
the Court assured counsel for Mr. Robison and the
parties that he considered the FMC letter offer of January 15, 1974 (R, 141) to be merely an offer to negotiate
and the basis for negotiation and not an acceptance of
as an offer or a sale as such. (T. June 28,1974, p.6 line
2)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Although it was indicated in the Minute Entry
that the hearing was reported, for some unexplained reason no record of it could be found. An affidavit from
Attorney Stott, confirming the statement of Shaw's counsel to the Court, not disputed by the Court, as to what
occurred at that hearing, as noted in the last record reference above was, suprisingly, not admitted by the
Court, but was left in the record as a proffer of proof.
(R. 311) Suffice it to say, there is no dispute that such
assurances was given by the Court at that time a considerable time after the court's February order. Further,
Intervenor is charged with notice of that proceeding and
the Court's assurances given there which were consistent
with his assurances given September 6, 1973.
In all events, the parties relied upon that assurance
by the Court, which was in all respects consistent with
their understanding that they had a continuing right to
settle their differences if they could. (T. June 28, 1974,
p.6 lines 11-22) That assurance was also consistent with
the prior and subsequent strong encouragement by the
Court of a settlement between the parties. It is also
consistent with the Court's order overruling Robison's
objections dated March 27, 1974 which provided:
"It is hereby ordered that the Objection of Ashley L. Robison to the Order of this Court authorizing the Receiver to proceed to negotiate a
sale with FMC Corporation are hereby overruled and denied." (R. 182) (Emphasis added.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Following the receipt by the Receiver's counsel of
a draft of a detailed agreement of sale in March, 1974
he furnished copies to counsel for Shaw and Robison
and conferred with them to receive their suggestions and
objections. Both raised serious objections to many of
the provisions which were added to or substantially different from those contained in the original letter offer.
(T. June 28, 1974, p,140; R. 378-387) Significantly, an
extremely important and extremely harsh Escrow Agreement (R. 388) which was to have been a part of the overall sales agreement was never furnished to counsel for
either Shaw or Robison until late June, 1974 and only then
because it was specifically requested. Nor did it accompany the proposed contract submitted to the Court for
approval. (R. 186-259) Nor was any form of Employment Agreement, which also was to have been a part of
the proposed contract, ever submitted to the Court. The
many substantial changes and additions actually proposed, as well as the incompleteness of the documents
submitted to the Court for approval demonstrated the
very general and preliminary nature of FMC's original
bid and the need which then remained and still remains
for further negotiations to refine and formalize any
binding agreement.
Having ignored, or at least having failed to incorporate into the sales agreement, even the most important
of the owners' serious objections, and having failed even
to furnish copies of the harsh Escrow Agreement to counsel or the Court, and having made no effort to discuss
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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or complete the contemplated Employment Agreements
with Shaw and Eobison, the Eeceiver on May 13, 1974
filed his Motion to Authorize Execution of Sales Contract. (E. 186-259) The Eeceiver's Motion shows clearly
his understanding, and that of his counsel, that even at
that date there had been no binding contract made with
the Intervenor. The Eeceiver properly petitioned:
"'That the Court enter its order approving
the execution of the document by the receiver in
a manner which is binding upon KOVO, Inc." (E.
186-187) (Emphasis added.)
Eelying upon the Lower Court's continuing and definite urging that it would like the parties to settle their
differences, and its clear and specific assurance that if
the owners' differences were resolved, it would terminate
the receivership, the owners and their counsel continued
to explore and narrow down the avenues of possible compromise. Sources of financial backing for a buy-sell arrangement, at first almost wholly lacking, became conditionally available. Furthermore, the negotiations concentrated on not only a sale of the business but a complete settlement of all of the very broad and difficult
issues, claims and differences between the parties as
well.
With substantial financial backing finally available,
(T. June 7, 1974, p.10 line 4) definite proposals for settlement were discussed between counsel for Shaw and
Eobison on May 1, 1974. (T. July 3, 1974, p.10). In a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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meeting between the owners and their counsel on May
3, 1974 a format for settlement negotiations was worked
out. During the ensuing ten-day period four additional
meetings were held involving 'counsel and the parties to
further narrow the areas of difference. (T. July 3, 1974,
p.11-12) All of the foregoing, of course, occurred before
the Receiver's Motion to Authorize Execution of Sales
Contract, dated May 11, 1974 had been received.
During the weeks of May 13th, May 20th and May
27th further extensive negotiations were conducted which
resulted in a resolution of the last remaining major
problems on May 30th. (T. July 3, 1974, p.12) At that
time counsel for the Receiver, who had previously been
advised that negotiations were proceeding which appeared to have possibilities of success, (T. July 3, 1974,
p.17 line 22; T. June 28, 1974, p.149 line 25, p,150 line 2)
was advised that a settlement had been achieved. At his
request counsel for the Intervenor was advised the following day. (T. July 3, 1974, p. 12-13) As early as May
24,1974 the Court had been advised that a settlement was
in the offing as reflected by the Minute Entry to that
effect in the file. (R. 262).
Between May 30th and June 5th the agreement between Shaw and Robison was reduced to writing and
finalized for all practical purposes. (T. July 3, 1974,
p.13; Exhibit 20) Prior to the hearing on the Receiver's
Motion, on June 5, 1974, counsel filed on behalf of Shaw
and Robison a Motion to Terminate Receivership and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Discharge Eeceiver, upon the ground that, "subject only
to approval of the Court/' '"ail outstanding issues have
been resolved and settled" between Shaw and Eobison.
(E. 266-267). The agreement was expressly conditioned
upon approval of the Court and termination of the receivership. (Exhibit 20; T. June 28, 1974, p.156 line 23)
In a hearing before the Court on June 7, 1974, the
Eeceiver and his counsel took no position pro or con
with respect to the Eeceiver ? s Motion. (T. June 7, 1974,
p.6 line 11) At that hearing the Court readily conceded
that it had consistently and strenuously urged settlement
(T. June 6, 1974, p.26 lines 24-30). The Court, for example, stated:
"The law favors settlement of differences amongst
parties outside the judicial process. I am most
reluctant to continue if these parties have actually settled their differences. As a matter of fact,
I have worked harder than coumsel to try to get
that for a year." (T. June 7, 1974, p. 20 lines
28-30, p.21 lines 1-2) (Emphasis added.)
Significantly, the Court observed at the conclusion of
that hearing:
"Now my concern is twofold. Am I bound
when the parties, the principals in this litigation,
have reconciled their differences? Am I bound
by that? My inclination to answer that question
is yes; second, does Mr. Greene's client have a
vested right and entitled to the protection of the
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Court? Mr. Greene has the burden of convincing
me of that. Do you understand that, Mr. Greene f
Those are the questions." (T. June 7, 1974, p.23
line 1-7) (Emphasis added.)
At a second hearing on the Receiver's Motion on
June 28, 1974, at which the Receiver again took no position either way on his own Motion, (T. June 28, 1974,
p.150 line 12) the Court conceded that it had advised
counsel at the March 15, 1974 hearing that it had intended the FMC letter offer to be merely an offer to negotiate
as is readily apparent from the following discussion between counsel and the Court:
"But at that hearing the Court was very explicit
in saying that this was merely an offer to negotiate and the basis for a negotiation and not
an acceptance of an offer or sale as such. The
contract was entered by the Court and approved
by the Court. I am sure we all proceeded on that
basis.
THE COURT: Your position simply I take
it is analogous to a probate proceeding where the
sale of the property is not final until it is approved by the Court, is that right?
MR. MARTINEAU: That is right"
(T. June 28, 1974, p.6 lines 7-16)
The Court also noted again at that hearing that:
"An overriding rule of law in this country is that
the law favors compromises and settlement. Apparently Mr. Conder and Mr. Martineau's clients
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have compromised their differences. This is not
a receivership that would involve the rights of
creditors." (T. June 28, 1974, p.8 lines 19-23)
The Court also noted,
"I think as far as those two people (Shaw and
Robison) are concerned they have got themselves
in a blind. Because they have settled their differences.
MR. MARTINEAU: We have, Your Honor."
(T. June 28, 1974, p.12, lines 1-4)
At a final hearing on July 3, 1974 the following discussion occurred:
"THE COURT: . . . I am considering the
purpose of why the Court is in this action in the
first instance.
MR. MARTINEAU: The reason was there
was a deadlock.
THE COURT: I am aware of that.
MR. MARTINEAU: And it couldn't be
straightened out without assistance of the Court.
The Court's assistance has allowed us to settle
these problems.
THE COURT: The only question I have at
the present moment is whether in the process of
doing that FMC, the intervenor, attained any
rights.
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MR. MARTINEAU: Well, or whether our
rights were divested." (T. July 3, 1974, p.33-34,
lines 3-20)
#

#

*

"THE COURT: (addressing counsel for the
Intervenor) Of course, absent your client's position, except for that, the Court would latch onto
that offer (settlement between Shaw and Robison) in a hurry, wouldn't it? Absent a person in
the position of your client?" (T. July 3, 1974,
p.39 line 26)
*

*

#

"I am not passing on the business judgment. Anytime a plaintiff and defendant come to a settlement of their differences the Court grabs onto
that in a hurry. That gets rid of the case, doesn't
it?
MR. GREENE: In this kind of a case with
this kind of background I would think not Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Except for a person in the
position of your client.
MR. MARTINEAU: This is an especially
appropriate case for that very thing." (T. July
3, 1974, p.40 line 6)
#

*

*

MR, MARTINEAU: I would say this, Your
Honor: The Court has consistently encouraged
us to settle. I think it has always been our understanding properly —
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THE COURT: I have been trying to get you
to either settle or appeal.
MR. MARTINEAU: I don't want to have
to appeal it if I don't have to, but let me say this:
It has always been our understanding in conferences with the Court and with the receiver and
his counsel that the letter of FMC was merely a
basis for negotiation. Any final document would
have to be negotiated, presented to the Court, and
approved before it become final. That is consistent with all the orders and all of the motions and
all of the proceedings in this Court. FMC cannot
claim they are not — that they can only rely on
one order of the Court and one letter from the
receiver, because everything else is very clear
the other way."
(T. July 3, 1974, p.539, lines 14-30, p.54 line 1)
"Mr. Gilbert and Mr. Roberts both said that they
intended that the letter was the basis for negotiation. (T. July 3, 1974, p.55) (Emphasis added.)
To the same effect is the testimony at T. July 3, 1974,
p.14 line 14:
"MR. MARTINEAU: I will further testify
that at no time have I advised my client that FMC
had a contract. I have never been advised by anyone that any offer of FMC has been accepted.
My conversations with Mr. Roberts were always
to the effect that a definitive contract would be
presented to this Court and approved before any
party would be bound."
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In a "KULING" dated July 29, 1974 the Court, in
direct contravention of its own specific assurance to the
owners and their counsel, that if a settlement were achieved it would be honored and the receivership would be
terminated, and contrary to the understanding of the
owners and their counsel as well as the Receiver and his
counsel, that the FMC letter offer had been approved
merely as the basis for negotiations, which understanding was specifically and expressly confirmed by the Court
at the hearing on March 15,1974, and in disregard of the
tremendous time, effort and expense incurred by the
owners in achieving a settlement which had been theretofore consistently and forcefully urged by the Court
with the specific assurance that it would be honored, and
in disregard also of the fact that the settlement was conditioned wholly as to its validity upon its approval by
the Court, and notwithstanding the numerous substantial
additions made in the contract as presented to the Court
for approval and its readily apparent incompleteness,
the Court granted the Receiver's Motion dated May 11,
1974. (R. 396-399) The owners' serious objections to
the contract as proposed were never even counsidered
by the Court.
This appeal, joined in by both Shaw and Robison,
is from that ruling.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE RECEIVER'S MOTION TO AUTHORIZE EXECUTION OF SALES CONTRACT..
A. In order for the proposed contract of sale to be
in any respect binding or effective it required the further specific approval of the Lower Court.
It is well established that the appointment of a receiver is an equitable function. 19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, % 1610, p.970. Where not provided by statute, as
in Utah, a receiver's sale is a judicial sale which rests
upon and is governed by orders of the court decreeing
the sale.
"[J]udicial sales, unless defined or regulated by
statute, rest upon and are governed by the order
of the court decreeing the sale. In a judicial sale
the court makes its own law of the sale, subject
only to the use of sound discretion in the exercise
of the power." Chapman v. Schiller, 95 Utah 514,
83 P.2d 249, 251 (1938).
It is a further well-established rule that
"[A] judicial sale must ordinarily be reported
to and confirmed by the court which ordered it."
47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judicial Sales, § 2, p.301.
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A bid at a judicial sale
"remains merely an offer to purchase umtil it is
accepted and confirmed by the Court."
and the purchaser
"bids with full notice that the sale to him is subject to judicial confirmation, that the Court has
the duty to exercise its discretionary power to
confirm so m to secure to the owner of the property the largest practical return, and that the
purchasers rights are subject to the rational exercise of such discretion" 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judicial
Sales § 136, p.407. (Emphasis added.)
It is also stated:
"It is generally regarded as essential to the completion of a judicial sale . . . to obtain final (judicial) confirmation." 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judicial
Sales, § 2b, p. 612-613:
The well-established rule, that not only acceptance
by the Court but confirmation as well are required to
bind the Court, is stated as follows in 50 C.J.S., Judicial
Sales A 25, p. 612-613:
"Since confirmation is the formal expression
of the judicial sanction of the sale, it is generally
essential to completion of a judicial sale. The
sale, however, is not a nullity until such confirmation.
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Confirmation is the formal expression of the
judicial sanction of the sale by which the court
makes the sale its own, and an order of confirmation is a judicial, and not a ministerial, act. It has
been held that confirmation is not the sale, but
only an approval of something already done.
Since before confirmation the sale is a sale
only in the popular, and not in a technical and
legal sense, and the accepted bidder is merely a
preferred purchaser, as discussed supra § 22, confirmation is necessary in order to complete the
sale, and in order to divest the former owner's
title and render valid the deed to the purchaser,
whether the sale is public or private." (Emphasis
added.)
Confirmation may be refused where the sale will work
an injustice to the parties.
"[T]he simple fact that confirmation would sacrifice the interests of those entitled to the protection of the court is sufficient ground for a refusal to confirm. . . . "

"Particular grounds for refusing to confirm
include: . . . mistake, misunderstanding or misrepresentation as to the terms or manner of sale.
. . . " 50 C. J.S., Judicial Sales, § 28, p.620.
Accordingly, the successful bidder at a judicial sale prior
to confirmation of the sale occupies merely the position
of the preferred purchaser, and has no rights substanDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tial enough to require that judicial confirmation be given
if there are legal or equitable reasons why it should not
owur. 50 C.J.S., Judicial Sales, § 22, p,606-607; J. S.
Sugarman Company v. Davis, 203 F.2d 931, 933-934 (10th
Cir. 1953). Also as noted in 2 Clark on Beceivers § 519
at 835:
"It has been held that a bidder at a receiver
sale acquires no enforceable rights until his bid
is accepted by the court."
If the nature of the judicial sale is such that a contract is necessary a judicial sale is not complete until
the bid and contract made in consequence thereof are
confirmed by the Court, 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers, §
106, p. 397. The definite rule that the judicial sale is not
complete until the Court confirms the actual contract of
sale is necessary and salutary rule in order for the Court
to be assured that the contract fairly and adequately reflects the terms of the bid and properly protects the interests of the owner of the property being sold by the
Court. Additionally where multiple parties are interested in property subject to a judicial sale it is within
the Court's discretion to grant rights to exclusive negotiation and the opportunity to proceed to negatiate a
contract with the Keceiver, but subject to obtaining final
judicial confirmation.
Both of the owners and their counsel understand and
believed throughout the proceedings until July, 1974, as
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did the Receiver and his counsel, that at every stage of
the receivership the Lower Court had acted and was acting within the rules set out above. They had every reason to believe, and did believe, that consistent with the
foregoing rules, the Lower Court was proceeding in a
manner so as to permit an alternative approach to a
proper disposition of the dispute. On the one hand, it
appointed the Receiver to manage the business and solicit
bids from prospective buyers. On the other hand, it gave
forceful encouragement to the parties to settle so that
a sale would be unnecessary. This dual approach to a
resolution of the problem is consistent with all actions
taken by the owners, thei rcounsel, the Receiver and his
counsel, and by the Court itself throughout the proceedings until July, 1974.
In requesting that the Receiver be appointed, counsel
specifically advised the Court that the appointment was
required in order to permit either (1) a settlement between the owners, or (2) a sale in liquidation. (T. Aug.
31, 1973, p.22 line 2). And it would be difficult to express a more definite assurance, that upon settlement the
case would be dismissed, than that given to the owners
by the Court immediately following appointment of the
Receiver.
"MR. STOTT: . . . In the event the agreement is arrived at between the parties in this matter as to the sale or purchase of the corporation,
I suppose at that time the receiver would be dissolved and we would have no problems as far as—
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THE COURT: Not only would you have no
problem, but the Court would be more than happy
to entertain that petition. . . .
MR. STOTT: I assumed that was the case."
(T. Sept. 6, 1973, p.76 line 15)
In subsequent contracts with the Court and with the
Receiver and his counsel, the understanding that both a
sale of the business and a settlement by the owners were
being alternatively pursued was reinforced. For example, on January 24, 1974 the Receiver reported to
the Court his progress in locating a buyer for KOVO and
indicated that he would present the offers to the Court
and "seek approval from theCourt at that time (following presentation and evaluation of the offers) to proceed
with further negotiations and a final contract. . . . " (T.
Jan. 24, 1974, p.4 line 14) (Emphasis added). This report is consistent with the understanding that any final
contract would have to be presented to the Court for approval and confirmation.
Similarly on January 31, 1974, the Receiver moved
"for order of the court respecting sale of the corporate
assets," and prayed that a hearing be held to receive
evidence with respect to the highest and best offer received as of the date of the hearing. The Receiver in
his Motion further requested that, following the hearing,
the Court issue an order:
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" . . . authorizing the receiver to negotiate
and execute an appropriate contract of sale of the
corporate assets in accordance with the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated, § 16-10-93. (R. 151)
(Emphasis added.)
This Motion also is consistent with the understanding
of the owners, their counsel and the Receiver that the
letter offer of FMC would be accepted merely as the
basis for negotiation of a final contract which would
then be presented to the Court for approval and confirmation.
Again, at the hearing held pursuant to the Receiver's
request, on February 6, 1974, at which representatives
of >the Intervenor were present, counsel for the Receiver
explained that the purpose of the hearing was to present
the Court with the best offers:
"[F]or the purpose of having the court determine which of these constitutes the highest and
best offer, and then requesting the court to authorize the receiver to proceed to negatiate a firm
and binding contract of sale with the offeror who
has presented the highest and best offer." (T.
Feb. 6, 1974, p,2 line 7) (Emphasis added.)
Certainly at that time the Receiver's counsel contemplated, not that the FMC letter offer as such would be
accepted and confirmed by the Court, but that it would
upon acceptance be merely the basis for the negotiation
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of a detailed final contract which only upon further approval and confirmation by the Court would become binding upon the Court, and parties or KOVO.
The Intervenor is, of course, charged with knowledge of the pleadings, notices, etc. filed with the Court
and with matters developed at hearings before the Court.
With even more justification, the Intervenor is charged
with knowledge of matters developed in hearings at
which it was represented and matters developed in pleadings and in hearings after it entered into the picture.
Thus it cannot now claim that it was not aware of the
strenuous efforts of the Court to encourage settlement
or the fact that from the orders, motions and discussions
referred to above the parties as well as the Receiver and
his counsel reasonably understood that the FMC letter
was, if accepted, to be used merely as the basis for negotiation and that a final contract would have to be given
further approval and confirmation by the Court to be
binding.
FMC's counsel was present when the Court on February 6, 1974, for the umpteenth time restated his strong
view that the parties should, if possible, settle the case
so as to make unnecessary the intervention of the Court
to liquidate the corporation. The Court stated:
"[T]he one (thing) that would make me the most
happy (is) for the shareholders to agree on something."
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"[I] would be most happy if a modus operandi
could be worked out or a proposal acceptable to
all parties could be arrived at without the interest
of the Court.
MR. ROBERTS: I would be most pleased if
we could do that, Your Honor." (T. Feb. 6, 1974,
p.3-4, line 18)

THE COURT: My concern is to try to see
to it that . . . the offer . . . will be . . . acceptable
to (the owners). You understand this is not a
liquidation receivership.
MR. HARDY: I understand." (T. Feb. 6,
1974, p.10 line 21)
Following the hearing and submission to the Court
of a report of the Receiver, in which the Receiver recommended the less desirable Intervenor offer over the other
offers, primarily as a matter of fairness to the owners,
the Court entered an order dated February 22,1974 that:
"[T]he report and recommendation of the
receiver be accepted by the court and filed in this
proceeding and that the receiver proceed to accept the offer of F.M.C. and proceed with all reasonable dispatch to conclude a sale to that offeror." (R. 173) (Emphasis added.)
This order, which the Court later erroneously found
constituted acceptance of the FMC offer clearly was no
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such thing. It merely accepts the report of the Receiver
and instructs him to proceed toward a binding acceptance.
The letter dated February 27, 1974 to counsel for
the Intervener from counsel for the Receiver advised
that the Lower Court had approved the Receiver's recommendation which was to approve the FMC offer as
the basis for further negotiations in order to finalize a
contract which could then be submitted to the Court for
approval and confirmation and requested from the Intervener "the draft contract so that we may proceed as
soon as possible to negotiate all final terms and finalize
the matter." (R. 314) (Emphasis added.)
Copies of this letter were not sent to the co-owners
or their counsel.
On March 15, 1974 the Lower Court considered objections to its order of February 22nd filed by Robison
and in its order overruling said objections the Lower
Court stated:
"(1) It is hereby ordered that the objections
of Ashley L. Robison to the order of this court
authorizing the receiver to proceed to negotiate
a sale with FMC Corporation are hereby overruled and denied." (R. 182) (Emphasis added.)
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At the March 15th hearing the Court expressly advised those present that he had not approved any sale
to the Intervenor and that he had only approved Intervener's offer as a basis for negotiation.
The settlement negotiations by the owner are themselves further evidence of their understanding, consistent
with all of the foregoing, that a settlement between them
would be honored by the Court if achieved before any
final contract was submitted to the Court for approval
and confirmation. Otherwise, on what basis and for what
reasons would they be negotiating? Without the business to buy or sell there would be virtually nothing to
negotiate or settle upon.
The settlement which should have been approved
by the Lower Court resolves not only the issues which
required the appointment of the Receiver but also all
other issues and claims between the owners as well, including the very difficult and potentially time-consuming
accounting claims between the owners, claims with respect to ownership and management of KOVO and other
serious and substantial claims among and between the
owners. Settlement reached by the owners, moreover,
was far superior from a financial standpoint, for both
owners than sale to the Intervenor could possibly have
been. The offer submitted by Intervenor was, at best,
at distress prices as would be expected.
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On May 11, 1974 the Receiver petitioned the Court
for its order to authorize execution of a sales contract.
In making its motion the Receiver clearly acknowledged
his understanding, again consistent with all of the foregoing, that there was then no binding contract with the
Intervenor and requested "that the court enter its order
approving the execution of the document by the receiver
in a manner which is binding upon KOVO, Inc." (R.
186-187) (Emphasis added) Serious negotiations by
the owners toward settlement were well advanced before
they were aware of the Receiver's motion, as is noted
in the Statement of Facts, above. Both the Court and
Receiver's counsel were advised that serious negotiations
were proceeding with some reasonable chance of success
at least two weeks before the hearing on the Receiver's
motion for approval. The owner's motion to terminate
the receivership was also filed prior to the hearing on
the Receiver's motion.
Ignoring all of the foregoing background, and in direct contradiction of his own encouragement of settlement and his direct, consistent and explicit assurances
that such a settlement would be honored, the Court in
its RULING dated July 29, 1974 concluded that Intervenor had acquired vested rights on February 22, 1974
and therefore directed the Receiver to proceed to conclude the sale. (R. 396-399) The Court's Ruling in favor
of the Intervenor totally ignores the rights and interests
of the owners, whose property is under the total control
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and mercy of the Court, and whose interests it was the
Court's primary duty to protect. Instead the ruling
favors the rights and interests of the Intervenor, who
was charged with knowledge of 'the reasonable, but apparently misplaced, reliance of the owners and the Receiver upon the specific prior encouragement and assurances of the Court.
As is clearly demonstrated from the references to
the record set forth above and in the Statement of Facts,
the Court initially established a procedure, consistently
followed and relied upon thereafter by the owners and
the Receiver, whereby it was understood 'that the judicial
sale would not be complete or binding until the final contract of sale was approved. Clearly indicated in the motions made by the Receiver, and relied upon by the
owners, is the fact that to be binding the final contract
had still to be confirmed at the time the owners moved
the Lower Court for its order terminating the receivership.
It is incredible, and indeed shocking, that the Lower
Court would conclude as it did that FMC acquired vested
and binding contract rights by virtue of its order dated
February 22, 1974 in disregard of its continuing and explicit encouragement, given in the presence of FMC's
counsel, to the parties to continue their settlement efforts
at the hearing on February 6, 1974. It is even more incredible and shocking in view of the Court's specific
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tract rights had been given and its continuing encouragement of settlement thereafter. In explanation, the Court
by July, 1974 had, perhaps understandably, forgotten the
encouragement and the assurances shown in the record
and relied upon by the parties. The transcript reviewing
these assurances was not before the Court to be considered in connection with its decision, because no transcript had then been prepared.
Although the integrity of dealings between the Court
and third parties must be carefully preserved, as the
Court suggests in its EULING dated July 29, 1974 (E,
396-399), the dealings between the Court and counsel,
and between the Court and parties who repose their
property and confidence with the Court and who rely
upon the Court's specific assurances and act thereon,
must be even more closely preserved. This is especially
true in this case where the third party is charged with
actual knowledge of the Court's encouragement of settlement and with at least constructive notice of pleadings
filed with the Court and proceedings held in the Court,
all relied upon by the owners, thereafter. To accept the
result of the Court's EULING of July 29, 1974 in this
case would make a mockery and a farce of the prolonged,
difficult, time-consuming efforts of the parties to achieve
a settlement they believed they had every right as well
as full encouragement to make. They were never advised
and had no reason to believe their rights had been divested or that they should cease, or even slacken, their
settlement efforts.
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The specific language of the Court's order dated
February 22, 1974 and the Receiver's letter to FMC's
counsel dated February 27, 1974, even absent the background of preceding and following events, is at the most
uncertain. In the context of pleadings, hearings, discussions and conduct of the parties, however, there should
be no doubt that they do not create a contract or give
FMC any binding rights. Yet the Lower Court, surprisingly, resolved the matter against the owners.
In view of the extended dealings between the Court
and the owners, and their clear, good-faith and full re^
liance upon the Court's wishes and its assurances, it is
especially important that their rights and interests be
recognized and protected. Otherwise the high confidence
reposed in the Court by counsel and by the parties in
litigation is seriously and irreparably eroded and justice
severely suffers. The Lower Court must protect and give
primary consideration to the interests and rights of
parties who come before it for assistance.
B. Intervenor had notice of the Receiver's limited
authority and acquired no vested rights.
A receiver is an agent of the Court and all persons
dealing with the receiver are chargeable with knowledge
of the receiver's authority to act or contract. 2 Clark
on Receivers, § 433, p.277. This rule is fundamental and
necessary to permit effective judicial sales and the law
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is well established that persons dealing with a receiver
do so at their peril. 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers, § 188 p.20
Also, it is well established that the receiver has no implied power to contract merely because he is a receiver
but rather a receiver must be empowered <to act by order
of the appointing court. 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers, §
236, p.57. As noted in 3 Clark on Receivers, § 765, p.1418:
"An equity receiver has only such powers as
are granted by the order appointing the receiver
or subsequent orders of the court appointed the
receiver and those powers granted by the usages
and rules of equity."
Here there can be no question that the Intervenor
must be charged with constructive notice of the Receiver's limited authority and his lack of authority to
make a binding contract for sale without further approval of the Court. Further there should be little question, in light of the representations made by the Court,
that the orders signed by it were not sufficient to result
in a binding contract as of February, 1974. Certainly
there could have been no binding contract at the time the
owners moved to terminate the receivership. That motion, therefore, should have been granted. For the foregoing reasons it is evident that Intervenor's arguments
concerning reliance and/or promissory estoppel are
wholly without merit.
The Lower Court's conclusion that Intervenor acquired vested rights and a "binding, lawful and forceable
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contract" by virtue of the Court's order of February
22, 1974 is simply contrary to the facts, as noted above.
The status of a bidder at a judicial sale between, the
time his bid is accepted by a receiver and confirmed by
the Court appointing the receiver was explained by
Judge Learned Hand in Freehill v. Greenfield, 204 F.2d
907, 908, 909 (2nd Cir. 1953):
"The court was plainly right that an accepted
bid at a judicial sale, subject to confirmation,
binds the bidder, though it does not bind the court.
It is to be considered as a contract concluded between the parties but subject to the consent of
the third person; indeed, it would otherwise be
difficult to conduct judicial sales at all." (Emphasis added)
And in Morris v. Burnett, 154 F. 617, 624 (8th Cir.
1907), the rights of a bidder before confirmation were
further explained:
"[T]here is a marked and radical distinction
between the situations, the rights of the parties,
and the established practice before and after the
confirmation of sale. The purchaser bids with full
notice that the sale to him is subject to confirmation by the court and that there is power granted
and a duty imposed upon the judicial tribunal
when it comes to decide whether or not the sale
shall be confirmed to so exercise its judicial power
as to secure for the owners of the property the
largest practical returns. He is aware that his
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rights as a purchaser are subject to the rational
exercise of this discretion. But after the sale was
confirmed that discretion has been exercised. The
power to sell and the power to determine the price
at which the sale shall be made has been exhausted. From thenceforth the court and the successful bidder occupy the relation of vendor and
purchaser in an executed sale . . . " (Emphasis
added)
And as noted in 2 Clark on Receivers, § 519 at 835, a
bidder at a receiver's sale acquired no enforceable right
until his bid has been accepted by the Court. And as is
explained in 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judicial Sales, § 179 at 441:
" . . . no purchaser has the right to rely absolutely upon the order of the court directing the
sale and the fact the agent of the court has pursued the terms prescribed thereby.
Thus it is evident that a purchaser at a judicial sale
before confirmation of the bid by the court has full notice
that his bid may not be accepted and is not entitled to
rely in any respect upon the simple fact that receiver
has looked with favor upon his bid.
The exact status and rights of a bidder after confirmation by the court is explained in 50 C. J.S., Judicial
Sales, § 22 at pp.606, 607:
"The bidder does not acquire any rights by
his bid until it is accepted and the sale is confirmed by the court. Until a sale is reported to,
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and confirmed by, the court, the bid remains an
offer, there is no binding contract, the sale is not
complete, and there is no sale in a legal, but only
in a popular sense. This is true even in respect
to a bid which has been accepted by the officer
conducting the sale, and accepted bidder in such
case being considered only a preferred proposer
or purchaser and the accepted bid being deemed
merely the best offer obtainable by the officer."
(Emphasis added)
Accordingly a bid accepted by the receiver does not
arise to the status of a vested right which would preclude a court from denying, in the exercise of its discretion, the confirmation of the sale to the bidder. In this
case the Receiver never intended to accept the bid without further approval of the Court.
This rule is the well-recognized law in Utah. In
Joseph Nelson Plumbing & Keating Supply Co. v. McCrea, 64 Utah 484, 231 P. 823 (1924) this Court refused
to confirm the Lower Court's judicial sale because of a
misunderstanding. This decision was explained in Atwood
v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 P.2d 377, 388, (1936) as standing
for the proposition that the court has wide discretion to
set aside a receiver's sale. These cases show that a
bidder, prior to confirmation, has no right which should
interfere with the court exercising its best judgment in
the interest of the parties affected by the sale. Consequently, the Intervenor's protracted argument to the
Lower Court about the expenditures it made in reliance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

44
upon the Receiver's approval of its bid and attempts to
utilize the doctrine of promissory estoppel are completely
without merit. Adopting the Intervener's position would
preclude courts from conducting effective judicial sales.
In any event, the very substantial effort, time, and expense incurred by the owners over a prolonged period
to work out a very difficult settlement at the Court's
request merit much greater consideration than the unsolicited efforts and expense by the Intervenor. At the
time the owners settled their differences the only interest
the Intervenor had in the proceedings was the exclusive
right to negotiate with the Eeceiver. This is buttressed
by the Court's representations at the March 15, 1974
hearing that no contract rights had been given the Intervenor and is further supported by the request of the
Eeceiver in May, that the Court approve a contract of
sale to the Intervenor "in a manner which is binding
upon KOVO." (E, 187) Clearly, the Lower Court erred
in determining that Intervenor acquired vested rights
in February, 1974 which precluded the Court from exercising its sound discretion to terminate the receivership as it had promised it would of the owner could settle
these differences.
POINT II
THE CONTRACT OF SALE PROPOSED BY
THE INVEEVENOE WAS MATERIALLY
DIFFERENT FROM ITS BID AND SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE
LOWER COURT.
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As is readily apparent from a comparison of the
initial letter offer of FMC (B. 141-144) and the detailed
contract submitted to the Court for approval (E. 189259) the changes between the two are not only numerous
but in a number of important respects very substantial.
For example, the new paragraph on "definitions" necessarily includes in the sale certain assets such as files,
records, books or account the logs nowhere included in the
letter offer. This same section requires that KOVO
recognize as valid financial and other reports not mentioned in the offer.
Of much greater significance is the provision in
paragraph 4(b) at page 7 of the Agreement which requires that $75,000.00 be placed in escrow against warranties. Although no escrow agreement accompanied the
letter offer and none was prepared to accompany the
Agreement submitted to the Court, a form of Escrow
Agreement not furnished to counsel for the owners or
to the Court, apparently prepared in March, 1974, requires the escrow agent to hold the funds for a period
of two years after closing and the closing itself according
to the Agreement is from 5-15 days after FCC approval
which generally takes from 4-6 months. Although the
letter offer merely conditions payment of the purchase
price upon conveyance of the assets, the Agreement adds
the condition of "performance" by KOVO as well before
any of the proceeds are payable. Thus it would be at
least two years after the closing which would be some 4-6
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months after this appeal is determined before Mr. Shaw
or Mr. Robison would have this very substantial portion
of the net proceeds of sale so as to be able to get into
another business. Yet they would be liable to pay taxes
on the entire transaction since it would not qualify as
an installment sale but would be without any funds to
meet that obligation. In the meantime, by terms of the
Escrow Agreement FMC would receive all interest and
earnings on both the $25,000.00 deposit and the $75,000.00
indemnity amount. The hardship and loss upon Mr.
Shaw and Mr. Robison and the substantial benefit to
FMC of this arrangement are obvious. That this constitutes a clear, substantial and totally new element in
comparison with the original letter offer cannot be seriously disputed. Nor can it be disputed that the escrow
requirements clearly demonstrate that the agreement
the court purported to approve does not fairly and properly protect the rights of the owner.
Another new provision involves trade-out accounts
which FMC's action mayaffect. Also, the tax conceits shareholders with an unknown liability and subject
to claims being made.
As noted, the Agreement provides for a cumbersome
indemnification process for the protection of FMC
whereby FMC is to be indemnified out of the $75,000.00
escrow fund set up for that purpose.
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Many new burdensome warranties are provided for
in the Agreement, which are in addition to the standard
warranties.
Many new conditions to the contract closing are imposed by FMC's proposed contract where were not contained in the prior letter offer.
The Agreement also provides that KOVO must warrant that there are no brokerage commissions to be
charged as a result of the sale, and further, that FMC
may terminate the Agreement, once executed, if the FCC
has not "finally approved" the transfer by July 31, 1975
or if for some reason the station's broadcasts are interrupted for a period in excess of 30 days. These provisions were not in the letter offer.
Finally, the Agreement provides that the rights
created thereunder are assignable by FMC, but implies
that KOVO may assign neither its rights or obligations
under the Agreement.
The net effect of these many changes added to the
Agreement which were not present in the offer is to substantially increase the burdens of KOVO and to substantially decrease the obligations of FMC. Many provisions have been added which would allow FMC to either
terminate the contract, once executed, or to renege on
the deal. Furthermore, the warranty provisions which
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have been added are so encompassing that KOVO assumes all the risks, even in areas of business dealing
which FMC's actions may effect. Also, the tax consequences to the principals have as noted above been seriously changed. They could, in fact, bring the owners
close to bankruptcy.
Because of the many substantial and important
changes in and incompleteness of the contract submitted
to the Lower Court it should have been disapproved and
rejected, even if a binding contract had in fact been made
in February, 1974.
The many changes demonstrated not only the need
to reject the contract as presented to the Court but the
sound reasons underlying the rule which requires specific confirmation by the Court of any final contract before
any vested rights accrue to the buyer and, more importantly, before any of the owners' rights are divested.
CONCLUSION
It is important to note in conclusion, as heretofore
pointed out to the Court, that (1) the primary purpose
of the receivership is to protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders whose property the Court
has under its control; (2) the policy of the law is and
must be to encourage and facilitate the settlement of disputes at every stage of a proceeding, including a receiverDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ship proceeding; (3) consistent with such a policy the
Lower Court consistently and forcefully encouraged the
parties here to work out a settlement which they have
done; (4) the Lower Court specifically assured the owners that it would honor a settlement between them and
the Lower Court expressly advised all parties that no
vested rights had been granted; (5) a third party dealing
with a Receiver and the Court in this context must act
at his peril and he may not presume that he has a binding
contract, when not only the Court record but the clear
conduct and understanding of the parties and the Receiver and their counsel and the documents theretofore
and thereafter prepared by the Receiver's counsel and
by FMC itself are inconsistent with that position, in that
they contemplate further court approval; (6) the goodfaith reliance of parties before the Court in the conduct
and assurances given by the Court must be honored and
recognized, and (7) the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders are clearly best served by the settlement with which they all agree and which conclude all of
the other difficult and substantial and issues between the
parties as well.
The Motion of the Receiver for approval of the
Agreement, as to which the Receiver and its counsel took
no position, should have been denied and the Motion of
the parties for dismissal of the receivership action, subject of course to proper safeguards and conditions, should
have been granted.
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In the alternative this Court should at the very minimum remand this case to the Lower Court with instructions that it scrutinize with care all provisions of any
contract which it may hereafter approve to insure not
only fair consistency with the initial FMC offer but adequate protection for the rights and interests of the owners and KOVO as well.
Respectfully
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